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HART'S CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM
MICHAEL PAYNE*

THE CONCEPT OF LAW, by H.L.A. Hart, is truly, in the words of
Ronald Dworkin, "a paradigm for jurisprudence. . . ."I The pur-

pose of this Article is to examine critically an important element in
Professor Hart's concept of law, the concept of the existence of a
legal system. The first two sections of this Article will elucidate the
"two minimum conditions necessary and sufficient for the existence
of a legal system,"I as well as clarify the relationship between Hart's
concept of a legal system and his concept of law. The second section
will focus on Rolf Sartorius's critique of Hart.
The third section contains a clarification and assessment of the
rationale behind the two minimum conditions for the existence of a
legal system, particularly the first minimum condition, which requires that private citizens need only obey the valid rules of a legal
system. The third section will be concerned also with Hart's concept
of authority, a concept of great interest recently to social scientists
and philosophers,3 which might seem rather unrelated to Hart's
concept of the existence of a legal system. After all, Hart does not
even examine formally the concept of authority in THE CONCEPT OF
LAW; in fact, early in the book he says that one cannot "profitably
use, in the elucidation of law, the notion of a command," because
"the element of authority involved in law has always been one of the
obstacles in the path of any easy explanation of what law is."' Nevertheless, Hart maintains that the coercive power of law presupposes its accepted authority, 5 and a key point in his attack against
John Austin's model of law' is that the sovereign's coercive orders
cannot "account for the continuity of legislative authority characteristic of a modern legal system." 7 Furthermore, much of the rationale for the two minimum conditions for the existence of a legal
system is developed in Hart's discussion of the continuity of legisla* B.A., Xavier University; M.A., Boston College; Ph.D., University of Georgia. Assistant
Professor of Philosophy, Grambling State University.
1. Dworkin, Hard Cases, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1057 (1975).
2. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 113 (1961).
3. For a comprehensive bibliography, see Friedman, On the Concept of Authority in Political Philosophy, in CONCEPTS INSOCIAL & POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 121 (R. Flathman ed. 1973).
4. HART, supra note 2, at 20.
5. Id. at 198.
6. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954).
7. Id. at 77.
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tive authority. Thus, the third section explicates the rationale for
the two minimum conditions and also elucidates Hart's concept of
authority and analyzes its relation to the two minimum conditions.
The final section of this Article will consider the implications for
Hart's concept of law in light of the conclusions reached in the first
three sections.
I.

THE EXISTENCE OF A LEGAL SYSTEM

Professor Hart elaborates two minimum conditions that are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for the existence of a legal
system:
On the one hand those rules of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must be generally
obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rules of recognition specifying
the criteria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted as common public standards of
official behaviour by its officials."
It is important to underscore that the first condition requires only
general obedience, rather than acceptance, by ordinary citizens.'
The second condition specifies that the officials must do more than
merely obey the rules of recognition, change, and adjudication:
"They must regard these [the secondary rules] as common standards of official behaviour and appraise critically their own and
each other's deviations as lapses."" According to the two conditions,
it is possible for a legal system to exist in which only officials accept
and use the system's criteria of legal validity." Such a society, Hart
comments, "might be deplorably sheeplike; the sheep might end in
the slaughter-house. But there is little reason for thinking that it
could not exist or for denying it the title of a legal system."'
To explicate the two conditions, it is necessary to elucidate three
distinctions basic to an understanding of Hart's concept of law: (1)
8. Id. at 113.
9. Hart says:
The first condition is the only one which private citizens need satisfy: they may
obey each 'for his part only' and from any motive whatever; though in a healthy
society they will in fact often accept these rules as common standards of behaviour and acknowledge an obligation to obey them, or even trace this obligation
to a more general obligation to respect the constitution.
Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.at 114.
12. Id.
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the distinction between primary and secondary rules, (2) how a
habit of obedience differs from the acceptance of a social rule, and
(3) the differences between rules that impose obligations or duties
and rules that do not impose obligations or duties.
Primary and Secondary Rules
According to Hart, a legal system may be best considered a
"union" of primary rules of obligation or duty and secondary rules
of recognition, change, and adjudication. Hart characterizes the
distinction between primary and secondary rules in the following
way:
Rules of the first type impose duties; rules of the second type
confer powers, public or private. Rules of the first type concern
actions involving physical movement or changes; rules of the second type provide for operations which lead not merely to physical
movement or change, but to the creation or variation of duties or
obligations.13
In Hart's view, a society might live only by primary rules of obligation, but will suffer from three defects: there will be uncertainty as
to what the rules are and their scope; the rules will be static insofar
as there is no means of deliberately eliminating or introducing rules;
and, the social pressure by which rules are maintained will be
inefficient because there is no agency for finally settling disputes
over violations of the primary rules." These defects may be remedied by secondary rules that "specify the ways in which the primary
rules may be conclusively ascertained, introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation conclusively determined." 51 Thus,
a secondary rule of recognition will remove the uncertainty of the
regime of primary rules by providing a rule for conclusive identification of the primary rules of obligation."6 Secondary rules of change
will remedy the static character of primary rules by empowering an
individual or body to introduce new primary rules of conduct for the
group, or for some class within it, and to eliminate old rules." The
remedy for the inefficiency of the social pressure is secondary rules
of adjudication empowering individuals to determine authorita13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 79.
at 90-91.
at 92.
at 93.
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tively whether, on a particular occasion, a primary rule has been
broken. '8 Hart concludes that "[t]he introduction of the remedy for
each defect might, in itself, be considered a step from the pre-legal
into the legal world," and that "certainly all three remedies together
are enough to convert the r6gime of primary rules into what is indisputably a legal system."' 9 The "union" of primary and secondary
rules may be regarded as the "essence" of law,"0 for a modern municipal legal system will combine both kinds of rules, and the secondary rule of recognition will unite all the rules of the system in that
all genuine laws will satisfy the criteria of validity specified by the
rule of recognition.
Habits of Obedience and Social Rules
The notion of acceptance of a social rule is important to an
understanding of Hart's concept of the existence of a legal system,
not only because legal officials must effectively accept the secondary rules, but also because the secondary rule of recognition, which
provides the criteria of legal validity by which the (valid) primary
rules may be identified, is a complex practice constituted by the
actual acceptance of the rule of recognition by the legal officials.
Hart elucidates the notion of acceptance by comparing the idea of
a group habit, such as watching television late at night, with that
of a social rule, such as driving on the right side of the street.
Although both involve behavior that converges or occurs "as a rule,"
they differ in three respects. First, when there is a social rule, deviations generally are regarded as faults open to criticism, and threatened deviations are met with pressure for conformity.' Secondly, for
a social rule to exist, criticism is not only in fact made but deviation
generally is accepted as a good reason for the criticism. 2 Thirdly, a
social rule exhibits an internal aspect, which Hart characterizes in
this way:
What is necessary is that there should be a critical reflective
attitude to certain patterns of behaviour as a common standard,
and that this should display itself in criticism (including selfcriticism), demands for conformity, and in acknowledgements
that such criticism and demands are justified, all of which find
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. at 94.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 151.
Id. at 54.
Id.
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their characteristic expression in the normative terminology of
'ought', 'must', and 'should', 'right' and 'wrong'. 3
A social rule also has an "external aspect which it shares with a
social habit and which consists in the regular uniform behaviour
which an observer could record." 24 Those who adopt the "internal
point of view" of social rules will regard the rules as reasons or'
justifications for behavior and for the criticism of behavior; social
rules are therefore normative, whereas group habits are not. But
similar to group habits, the critical reflective attitudesof the internal point of view are evidenced in terms of behavioral criteria; those
who adopt the internal point of view need not experience any particular feelings or have the same motive for adopting the critical reflective attitude. And because it is this form of social practice that
constitutes the acceptance of a rule,25 a social rule will exist as long,
and only as long, as the practice conditions for acceptance are satisfied. Therefore, to assert that a rule of recognition is the rule of
recognition of a legal system is to say that it is accepted by the legal
officials of that system. To accept a social rule, adoption of the
internal point of view is necessary, from which internal statements
may be made. But to say that the practice conditions for acceptance
are satisfied is to make an external statement from the external
point of view. Hence, the question whether a legal system exists is
a question of fact. Furthermore, whether citizens generally obey the
primary rules, and whether the legal officials effectively accept the
secondary rules as critical common standards of official behavior are
also matters of fact.
Rules That Impose Obligations and Rules That Do Not Impose
Obligations
The third distinction to be elucidated is that between rules that
impose obligations and rules that do not. According to Hart, the
idea of obligation makes sense only in the context of (normative)
social rules. Yet not all rules imply the existence of an obligation;
rules of etiquette, for example, do not impose obligations. Hart
explicates three characteristics that distinguish social rules that
impose obligations from those that do not: (1) rules imposing obligations are those rules for which the demand for conformity is insistent
23. Id. at 56.
24. Id. at 55.
25. Id. at 58.
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and the pressure against those who deviate or threaten to deviate is
great; (2) these rules are thought to be important because they are
believed necessary to the maintenance of social life; (3) the obligations and duties required by these rules are thought of as involving
sacrifice of renunciation." As with the internal point of view, the
person under obligation need not experience any particular psychological feelings; one need not feel obligated or under compulsion as
a result of the serious social pressure supporting rules of obligation.
"Hence there is no contradiction in saying of some hardened swindler that he had an obligation to pay the rent but felt no pressure
to pay when he made off without doing so." 2
II.

THE EXISTENCE OF A LEGAL SYSTEM VIS-A-VIs THE CONCEPT OF

LAw-SARTORIUS'S CRITIQUE OF HART

Hart's concept of the existence of a legal system is constructed out
of these three distinctions. Behind the concept is a structure built
with great care. Thus far perhaps this Article has scratched only the
surface of the edifice and has not yet come to grips with Hart's
concept of law. Rolf Sartorius would agree, for he argues that
Hart's two minimum conditions for the existence of a legal system
"constitute nothing more than purely formal criteria for the existence of a legal system. As such, they could be satisfied by the rules,
officials, and players of the National Football League, as well as
many other rule governed social organizations." 8 It will prove instructive to amplify and examine Sartorius's position to provide a
firmer grasp of Hart's concept of the existence of a legal system and
of the relation between this concept and Hart's concept of law.
Sartorius insists that Hart certainly is aware of the inadequacy
of defining law and morals in formal terms.29 The two minimum
conditions for the existence of a legal system, Sartorius contends,
are relevant neither to Hart's concept of a legal system nor to his
concept of law:
If one is intent upon extracting from Hart's analysis a
definition of 'legal system', indeed, if one wants. a complete picture of Hart's concept of law, one must put together (1) what is

said about the union of primary and secondary rules with (2)
26. Id. at 84-85.
27. Id. at 86.
28. Sartorius, Hart's Concept of Law, in MoRe
Summers ed. 1971).
29. Id.

ESSAYS

IN LEGAL PHrrosopHY 131, 139 (R.
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what Hart argues is the minimal content of Natural Law shared
by both law and morals, and then combine all of this with (3)
what Hart claims are the four features of morality which distinguish it from law, custom, etiquette, and other kinds of social
rules."
Sartorius rejects the suggestion that the views represented by (1),
(2), and (3) above together may form a real definition of the term

'legal system'; that is, that they are a set of conditions individually
necessary and jointly sufficient for the correct application of a term
or concept. 3' To the contrary, Sartorius argues that Hart clearly
perceives that the concept of a legal system is not to be elucidated
by a real definition," and that the term 'legal system' is for Hart

what Professor Hilary Putnam calls a "cluster concept.

33

Cluster

30. Id.
31. As a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, a real definition
indicates those properties the possession of each of which is necessary and the possession of
all of which is sufficient for the correct application of a term or concept. For example, to say,
in the classical definition per genus et differentia, that 'man' means rational animal, is to
say both that for X to be a man, X must have the properties of rationality and animality (so
that whatever lacks either property cannot be a man), and that if X has both properties of
rationality and animality, X is a man. For his criticism of the notion of real definition, see
R. SAirrORuus, INDIVIDUAL CONDUCT & SOCIAL Noras 37.40 (1975).
32. Sartorius, supra note 28, at 141. As Hart has explained:
I am not sure that in the case of concepts so complex as that of a legal system
we can pick out any characteristics, save the most obvious and uninteresting
ones, and say they are necessary. Much of the tiresome logomachy over whether
or not international law or primitive law is really law has sprung from the effort
to find a considerable set of necessary criteria for the application of the expression 'legal system'. Whereas I think that all that can be found are a set of criteria
of which a few are obviously necessary (e.g., there must be rules) but the rest
form a subset of criteria of which everything called a legal system satisfies some
but only standard or normal cases satisfy all.
Hart, Theory & Definitionin Jurisprudence,29 PROC. OF Tma AiusToT uAN Soc'y 251-2 (1955).
33. Sartorius, supra note 28, at 142. Professor Putnam has illustrated this concept with the
following example:
Suppose one makes a list of the attributes P,, P, ... that go to make up a
normal man. One can raise successively the question 'Could there be a man
without P,?' 'Could there be a man without P2?' and so on. The answer in each
case might be 'Yes' and yet it seems absurd that the word 'man' has no meaning
at all . ..the meaning in such a case is given by a cluster of properties. To
abandon a large number of these properties, or what is tantamount to the same
thing, to radically change the extension of the term 'man', would be felt as an
arbitrary change in its meaning. On the other hand, if most of the properties in
the cluster are present in any single case, then under suitable circumstances we
should be inclined to say that what we had to deal with was a man.
Putnam, The Analytic & the Synthetic, 3 MINN. STUDIES INTHr PHIL.OF Sc. 378 (H. Feigl &
G. Maxwell eds. 1962).
For a recent apparent attempt to treat the term 'legal system' as a cluster concept, see M.
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concepts or terms are "such that few, if any, of the conditions asso-

ciated with them (i.e., satisfied in the standard or paradigm cases
of their correct application) are individually necessary, and those
'34
which are necessary are not jointly sufficient.

The Union of Primary and Secondary Rules
The following passages clearly indicate that Hart does not offer
the union of primary and secondary rules as a real definition of
'law':
The union of primary and secondary rules is at the centre of a
legal system; but it is not the whole, and as we move away from
the centre we shall have to accommodate . . . elements of a

different character.3 These truths [about certain important aspects of law] can, however, only be clearly presented, and their
importance rightly assessed, in terms of the more complex social
situation where a secondary rule of recognition is accepted and
used for the identification of primary rules of obligation. It is this

6-17 (1975). Golding examines five conditions that elucidate the
statement that "A legal system exists in a society S": (1) there are laws in S, and there exist
in S jural agencies for (2) making and changing the laws, (3) determining infractions of the
laws, (4) enforcing the laws, and (5) settling disputes between individuals. Following Hart,
see note 32 supra, Golding argues that legal systems must have as necessary conditions only
laws and jural complexity. But according to Golding, jural complexity may assume many
forms, so that one legal system may lack condition (3), while another may lack condition (4)
and condition (5).
34. Sartorius, supra note 28, at 142. See also SARToRius, supra note 31, at 37-40, in which
he distinguishes between Wittgenstein's notion of "family resemblances" and Putnam's
"cluster concept." The notion of "family resemblances" maintains that at least some class
terms do not have any common properties. Wittgenstein puts the point this way:
Consider for example the proceedings that we call 'games.' I mean board-games,
card-games, ball-games, Olympic games, and so on. What is common to them
all?-Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be
called 'games' "-but look and see whether there is anything common to
all.-For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all,
but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that.
L. WITrGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 66, at 31 (1958).
Although both a family resemblance concept and a cluster concept deny that all class terms
have common properties, Sartorius sees this difference between them:
[llt may be possible to describe a standard case of a cluster concept which can
serve as a paradigm for any other typical exemplar of the concept; this cannot
be the case with a family resemblance concept. A paradigm case of a board
game, such as chess, for instance, cannot serve as a paradigm for the quite
different kind of game of which baseball is an instance. This captures the point
of Wittgenstein's notion of family resemblance; different exemplars of the same
concept may be equally paradigmatic and yet share no common defining characteristics; there simply is no single set of features definitive of what it is to be a
paradigm. SARTORIUS, supra note 31, at 40.
35. HART, supra note 2, at 96.
GOLDING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW
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situation which deserves, if anything does, to be called the foundations of a legal system." The main theme of this book is that
so many of the distinctive operations of the law, and so many of
the ideas which constitute the framework of legal thought, require for their elucidation reference to one or both of these two
types of rule, that their union may be justly regarded as the
'essence' of law, though they may not always be found together
wherever the word 'law' is correctly used."
The union of primary and 'secondary rules is the 'essence' of law, as
Sartorius points out, in the sense that it is the most important
feature or features of a legal system;" in the words of John Austin,
it is "the key to the science of jurisprudence."39 But their union is
not necessary for the correct application of the term 'law', and Hart
specifically discusses primitive law and international law as examples of sets of primary rules existing without secondary rules.
The Minimal Content of Natural Law
The general form of the argument for the minimum content of
Natural Law, Hart says, "is simply that without such a content laws
and morals could not forward the minimum purpose of survival
which men have in associating with each other."40 Assuming survival is an aim of human activity, "[rieflection on some very obvious generalizations-indeed truisms-concerning human nature
and the world in which men live, show that as long as these hold
good, there are certain rules of conduct which any social organization must contain if it is to be viable."4 1 Hart cites the following
generalizations: humans are vulnerable to bodily harm; they are
approximately equal in strength and intelligence; they have limited
altruism although they are neither angels nor are they predominantly selfish; there are limited resources; humans have limited
understanding and strength of will.4 Hart concludes:
We can say, given the setting of natural facts and aims, which
make sanctions both possible and necessary in a municipal system, that this is a natural necessity; and some such phrase is
36.. Id. at 97.
37. Id. at 151.
38. Sartorius, supra note 28, at 133.
39. J. AusTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE
40. HART, supra note 2, at 189.
41. Id. at 188.
42. Id. at 190-93.

DETERMINED,

13 (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954).
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needed also to convey the status of the minimum forms of protection for persons, property, and promises which are similarly indispensable features of municipal law. It is in this form that we
should reply to the positivist thesis that 'law may have any content'. For it is a truth of some importance that for the adequate
description not only of law but of many other social institutions,
a place must be reserved, besides definitions and ordinary statements of fact, for a third category of statements: those the truth
of which is contingent on human beings and the world they live
in retaining the salient characteristics which they have.43
Notably, although Hart defends a minimum content of Natural Law
by which law must provide a system of mutual forbearances enforced by sanctions, he also maintains that the minimal protections
and benefits of such a system need not be extended to all members
of a society." Clearly, as Sartorius emphasizes, the minimum content of Natural Law "is not taken by Hart to constitute a necessary
definitional criterion for the existence of a legal system."" The minimum forms of protection for persons, property, and promises, as
well as the need for sanctions, are described by Hart as a natural
necessity, and the truisms about human nature and society are not
necessary truths but contingent statements.
The Four DistinguishingFeatures of Morality
Sartorius points out that although the minimum content of Natural Law distinguishes a legal system from an organization like the
National Football League, "[wihat is easily conceivable . . .is a
moral code having both the form of a union of primary and secondary rules as well as the minimal content demanded by Hart's version
of Natural Law."" To distinguish between morality and law, Hart
elucidates four cardinal related features that collectively serve to
distinguish morality from legal rules and from other forms of social
rule." The first distinguishing feature is importance. A legal rule
regarded as unimportant is a legal rule until it is repealed whereas
a moral rule is believed to be important." A second difference is that
although a legal rule may be introduced or eliminated by deliberate
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 195.
Id. at 195-96.
Sartorius, supra note 28, at 144.
Id. at 140.
HART, supra note 2, at 169.
Id. at 169-71.
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enactment, moral rules or principles are not subject to deliberate
change by enactment. 9 Thirdly, moral offenses are of a voluntary
character. If a person establishes that he or she acted unintentionally, he or she is excused from moral responsibility. In law, this often
is not true, as in systems that employ strict liability."0 Finally the
form of moral pressure differs. In law, the typical form of pressure
exerted in support of the rules is the threat of punishment. The
typical form of moral pressure is an appeal to the respect for the
rules, as things important in themselves. This respect for the rules
presumably is shared by those addressed. 1
Critiqueof Sartorius
Sartorius maintains that the union of primary and secondary
rules, the minimal content of Natural Law shared by both law and
morals, and the four distinguishing features of morality do not comprise a real definition of 'legal system' and advances two arguments
to support his contention that Hart's concept of a legal system is a
cluster concept.52 First, Sartorius argues that although Hart postulates that the existence of a rule of recognition constitutes the foundation of a legal system, he does not claim that its existence is
necessary for the existence of a legal system. 5 For example, primitive communities, in Hart's view, may live in regimes of primary
rules alone, and Sartorius quotes Hart as saying that "'it is possible
to imagine a society without a legislature, courts, or officials of any
kind,'

. . .

which would 'live by

. .

. primary rules alone'." 4 Sec-

ondly, Sartorius argues that the minimum content of Natural Law
is not a necessary definitional criterion for the existence of a legal
system, as has been seen above. 5
49. Id. at 171-73.
50. Id.at 173-75.
51. Id. at 175.
52. See notes 32 & 33 supra & accompanying text.
53. Sartorius, supra note 28, at 143.
54. Id., quoting HART, supra note 2, at 89. Further, Hart's comments on international law
are used by Sartorius to bolster his criticism:
It is, therefore, a mistake to suppose that a basic rule or rule of recognition is a
generally necessary condition of the existence of rules of obligation or 'binding'
rules. This is not a necessity, but a luxury, found in advanced social systems
whose members not merely come to accept separate rules piecemeal, but are
committed to the acceptance in advance of general classes of rule, marked out
by general criteria of validity.
Id. at 143-44, quoting HART, supra note 2, at 229.
55. See note 45 supra & accompanying text.
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Sartorius's argument can be criticized at this point. Hart quite
clearly does not mean to offer a real definition of 'law', nor does he
consider the minimum content of Natural Law part of a real definition of 'legal sytem.' Sartorius is also correct that the union of primary and secondary rules, the minimal content of Natural Law, and
the features distinguishing law from morality do not form a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for the term 'legal system.' My
disagreement with Sartorius is with his main contention that a rule
of recognition is not necessary for the existence of a legal system.
Sartorius's error is that he fails to distinguish between Hart's
concept of law and his concept of a legal system, a distinction developed by Hart in terms of the difference between a set and a system.
The rules of international law, according to Hart, do not form a
system but a mere set.55 And in the regime of primary rules alone,
"the rules by which the group lives will not form a system, but will
simply be a set of separate standards, without any identifying or
common mark, except of course that they are the rules which a
particular group of human beings accepts. 5' 7 It is precisely the rule

of recognition that unites the rules of a set, resulting in what is
called a single legal system. Thus Hart argues that the practice
conditions for acceptance by the legal officials of the rule of recognition are "not merely a matter of the efficiency or health of the legal
system, but [are] logically a necessary condition of our ability to
speak of the existence of a single legal system.""8
Hart's concept of law, therefore, includes on the one hand sets of
primary rules alone, such as primitive law and international law,
and on the other hand, systems of primary and secondary rules
united by secondary rules of recognition. It is submitted that once
a distinction between 'law' and 'legal system' is recognized in THE
CONCEPT OF LAW, Sartorius's notion of a cluster concept accurately

describes Hart's use of the term 'law,' for Hart does say that the
purpose of the book "is not to provide a definition of law, in the
sense of a rule by reference to which the correctness of the use of
56. HART, stipra note 2, at 229. The failure to distinguish between 'law' and 'legal system'
undermines a recent attack on Hart in Note, Hart, Austin, and the Concept of a Legal
System: The Primacyof Sanctions, 84 YALE L.J. 584 (1975). This Note is heavily indebted
to Sartorius's explication of Hart, so much so that the Note not only does not discuss Hart's
two minimum conditions of the existence of a legal system, but also does not even mention
that Hart provides the two minimum conditions.
57. HAr, supra note 2, at 90.
58. Id. at 112-13.

1976]

LEGAL SYSTEM

the word can be tested." 59 It does not follow, however, that Hart also
utilizes a cluster concept of 'legal system,' at least not for the reasons Sartorius gives.
Sartorius rejects the view that the two minimum conditions for
the existence of a legal system constitute a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the application of the term
'legal system' simply because these are formal criteria that could be
satisfied by many rule-governed organizations. Sartorius is correct
that Hart is aware of the inadequacy of defining 'law' in formal
terms without regard to content. Perhaps Hart refers to the two
conditions as "minimum" conditions to indicate that they must of
"natural necessity" be supplemented by the minimum content of
Natural Law. As Sartorius points out, however, the minimum content of Natural Law cannot be a necessary definitional criterion for
the existence of a legal system.
Hart seems to take another approach that Sartorius fails to consider. The two minimum conditions are based on the distinction
between primary rules of legal obligation and secondary rules of
recognition, change, and adjudication. The primary rules are rules
of legal obligation because they are the valid rules of the legal system; they are valid rules of the legal system because they satisfy all
the criteria provided by the rule of recognition."0 According to Hart,
the rule of recognition is the ultimate rule of a legal system, in that
as the criterion of valid rules, internal questions about the validity
of the rule of recognition cannot be raised; only external questions
about the existence of the rule of recognition may be asked.6 ' A
social organization may have all the formal characteristics of a municipal legal system, including a constitution accepted by its members. In this sense, Hart probably would not object to saying that
some social organizations have legal systems. But Hart would not
say that the National Football League is the legal system of the
United States, because although the National Football League is
subject to the ultimate rule of recognition of the United States, it
does not have the ultimate rule of recognition. The constitution of
a social organization may be the rule of recognition for that
organization, but questions concerning the legal validity of that
constitution may be raised. This argument demonstrates that the
59. Id. at 17.
60. Id. at 100.
61. Id. at 103-05.
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two minimum conditions do seem to provide a set of individually
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal
system, just as Hart says.
One objection to the two minimum conditions however appears
to be nearly decisive. If the distinction between primary and secondary rules cannot be made adequately, the two minimum conditions,
based as they are on that distinction, will fail. Professors Singer"2
and Sartorius"3 have detected ambiguity in the ways in which Hart
draws the distinction. The primary rules consistently are characterized as rules imposing duties or obligations, but the secondary rules
seem to have two different characterizations. First Hart describes
secondary rules as rules that "confer powers, public or private,"' "
enabling citizens to create or vary their legal relations (private powers) and enabling legal officials to legislate and adjudicate (public
powers). But Hart also describes secondary rules in another way:
Thus they [secondary rules] may all be said to be on a different
level from the primary rules, for they are all about such rules; in
the sense that while primary rules are concerned with the actions
that individuals must or must not do, these secondary rules are
all concerned with the primary rules themselves. They specify the
ways in which the primary rules may be conclusively ascertained,
introduced, eliminated, varied, and the fact of their violation
conclusively determined. 5
In this passage, Hart characterizes the secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication, all of which are about the primary
rules. But many secondary power-conferring rules will not be about
the primary rules, especially those that confer powers on private
individuals. Furthermore, the rule of recognition, which specifies
the criteria of legal validity, need not be a power-conferring rule, as
Professor Jonathan Cohen points out:
The rules he [Hart] calls rules of recognition are not rules that
confer powers, whether public or private: they set up criteria.
They determine the sources of law: they do not give power to
someone to make it, like the rules that Hart calls 'rules of
change'."
62. Singer, Hart's Concept of Law, 60 J. PHIL. 197, 208-09 (1963).
63. Sartorius, supra note 28, at 136-38.
64. HART, supra note 2,at 79.

65. Id. at 92.
66. Cohen, Hart's Concept of Law, 71 MIND 395, 408 (1962).
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Apparently Hart's two characterizations of secondary rules cannot
be reconciled; consequently, unless some satisfactory characterization of secondary rules is made, the two minimum conditions for the
existence of a legal system must be rejected. Of course, there may
be further objections to the two minimum conditions, some of which
will be considered in the next section. 7
1H.

THE RATIONALE FOR THE MINIMUM CONDITIONS

The explication of the rationale for the two minimum conditions
for the existence of a legal-system may be divided into two parts:
the first condition requiring general obedience of the primary rules
by the private citizens and the second condition requiring acceptance of the secondary rules by the legal officials. But Hart's development of the rationale begins with his criticism of John Austin's
doctrine of sovereignty."8 An elucidation of Hart's concept of authority is necessary in examining his critique of Austin. Once the rationale behind the two minimum conditions has been explicated, the
rationale for the first condition requiring general obedience of the
valid laws by ordinary citizens will be examined critically.
Hart's Critique of Austin's Doctrine of Sovereignty
Austin's doctrine of sovereignty contains two elements relevant to
Hart's criticism. Wherever there is a legal system there must be (1)
a determinate person or body of persons rendering habitual obedience to no one, and (2) subjects who render habitual obedience to
this sovereign person or body of persons. Of Hart's criticisms of the
Austinian sovereign, the concern here pertains to the idea of habitual obedience. In particular, Hart argues that the idea of a habit of
obedience is deficient in that it cannot account for "the continuity
of the authority to make law possessed by a succession of different
legislators, and the persistence of laws long after their maker and
those who rendered him habitual obedience have perished.""9
To appreciate the difficulty Austin's theory has with explaining
the continuity of legislative authority on the basis of habits of obedience, Hart asks the reader to imagine a very simple society in which
Rex is sovereign. On the Austinian model of sovereignty, Rex enjoys
the habitual obedience of his subjects. Yet if Rex dies and is suc67. See notes 84-96 infra & accompanying text.
68. J. AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (H.L.A. Hart ed. 1954).
69. HARr, supra note 2, at 50.
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ceeded by Rex II, the latter cannot, on the Austinian model, be
sovereign, because he enjoys no habitual obedience. It is precisely
to avoid this difficulty, Hart contends, that there must be rules
providing for the succession of a sovereign:
If the rule provides for the succession of the eldest son, then Rex
II has a title to succeed his father. He will have the right to make
law on his father's death, and when his first orders are issued we
may have good reason for saying that they are already law, before
any relationship of habitual obedience between him personally
and his subjects has had time to establish itself.7°
Hart argues that the Austinian habits of obedience neither can confer any right or title of succession nor make it probable that the
successor's orders will be obeyed:
If there is to be this right and this presumption at the moment
of succession there must, during the reign of the earlier legislator,
have been somewhere in the society a general social practice more
complex than any that can be described in terms of habit of
obedience: there must have been the acceptance of the rule under
which the new legislator is entitled to succeed."
The root cause of failure of Austinian habits of obedience is that
they cannot yield the idea of a rule.72 Without the notion of general
acceptance of a (normative) social rule of succession, the authority
to legislate cannot be conferred. Hart concludes that because the
acceptance of a rule of succession constitutes the existence of that
rule, "its acceptance affords.

. .

grounds both for the statement of

law that the successor has a right to legislate, even before he starts
to do so, and for the statement of fact that he is likely to receive
the same obedience as his predecessor does.""
The right or title to succeed Rex I is conferred on Rex II by a rule
of succession. The authority conferred on Rex 11 is de jure, as opposed to de facto, authority. To say that someone has authority in
the de jure sense is to claim that he or she has the right or title to
do something, and this presupposes a system of rules or method of
entitlement determining the possessor of this right or title. Thus,
Rex II may claim the right or title to succeed Rex I because he is
70.
71.
72.
73.

Id. at 53.
Id.at 54.
Id. at 78.
Id. at 57-58.
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warranted by a rule of succession. 'Authority' also is used in a de
facto sense to indicate that someone has the ability to elicit "a
distinctive kind of obedience, allegiance, or belief, involving
(roughly and provisionally speaking) deference or respect or trust."' '
Contrasting de facto authority with de facto power makes this distinction clearer. To say that someone is obeyed out of fear of punishment (Hart's notion of being obliged)75 or out of habit is not to say
that he possesses de facto authority, but that he possesses de facto
power, because the distinctive kind of obedience involving respect
or trust is missing. Furthermore, de jure authority does not imply
de facto authority; a ruler may have the de jure right to give orders,
yet his orders may be obeyed out of fear or habit (in which case he
lacks de facto authority), or they may even be ignored (in which case
he lacks de facto power). Nor of course does de facto authority imply
de jure authority; though unauthorized under a rule of primogeniture, the youngest brother of Rex II may possess the de facto authority that eludes a very unpopular Rex II.
Someone in authority of course may possess both de jure and de
facto authority, and to describe such a situation the term
"legitimate power" will be used. Apparently, Hart thinks that Rex
will have legitimate power, for, in his discussion of the continuity
of legislative authority, he writes:
We may suppose that our social group has not only rules which,
like that concerning baring the head in church, makes a specific
kind of behaviour standard, but a rule which provides for the
identification of standards of behaviour in a less direct fashion,
by reference to the words, spoken or written, of a given person.
In its simplest form this rule will be to the effect that whatever
actions Rex specifies (perhaps in certain formal ways) are to be
done. This transforms the situation which we first depicted in
terms of mere habits of obedience to Rex; for where such a rule
is accepted Rex will not only in fact specify what is to be done
but will have the right to do this; and not only will there be
general obedience to his orders, but it will be generally accepted
that it is right to obey him."
In this passage, Hart argues that when a rule of recognition to the
effect that whatever actions Rex specifies are to be done is generally
74. Friedman, On the Concept of Authority in PoliticalPhilosophy, in CONCEPTS INSOCIAL
& PO LrrCAL PHILOSOPHY 126 (R. Flathman ed. 1973).
75. HART, supra note 2, at 79-83.

76. Id. at 56-57.
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accepted throughout the society, Rex will have the de jure right to
legislate as well as de facto authority. Rex will have a claim to
exercise legitimate power because the majority of the members of
the society, in accepting and therefore adopting the internal point
of view, will consider it right to respect Rex's legal right to legislate.
With these distinctions in mind, we may now return to Hart's
discussion of the continuity of legislative authority. Having shown,
in the passage quoted above, the importance of generally accepted
social rules that underlie Rex's legislative authority, Hart continues:
In order to see how such rules explain the continuity of legislative authority, we need only notice that in some cases, even before
a new legislator has begun to legislate, it may be clear that there
is a firmly established rule giving him, as one of a class or line of
persons, the right to do this in his turn. Thus we may find it
generally accepted by the group, during the lifetime of Rex I, that
the person whose word is to be obeyed is not limited to the
individual Rex I but is that person who, for the time being, is
qualified in a certain way, e.g. as the eldest living descendant in
the direct line of a certain ancestor: Rex I is merely the particular
person so qualified at a particular time."
Hart begins with the notion of a rule of succession conferring de jure
authority to legislate on a line or class of persons. In the second
sentence, however, the rule of succession is contained within a rule
of recognition specifying that the word of a class of persons is the
law. Hart confuses the notion of de jure authority with that of de
facto authority. As noted above, when a rule of recognition is generally accepted, a claim to legitimate power may be made; when the
word of Rex is generally accepted, he may claim de jure and de facto
authority. But when a rule of succession is generally accepted, his
successor may claim only de jure authority on the basis of that rule.
In his argument Hart incautiously mixes secondary rules. A rule of
succession is technically a secondary rule of change. Thus, Hart
characterizes secondary rules of change as power-conferring rules
that "may, besides specifying the persons who are to legislate, define in more or less rigid terms the procedure to be followed in
legislation.""8 But from a secondary rule of change providing that
the eldest living descendant in the direct line of Rex I will succeed
77. Id. at 57.
78. Id. at 93.
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upon his predecessor's death, it does not follow that the rule of
recognition is that the word of Rex or his successors will be the law.
Apparently the difficulty with Hart's argument is quite minor and
may be dissolved simply by insisting that Hart could have established his main point against Austin without confusing a rule of
succession with a rule of recognition. The criticism of the Austinian
habits of obedience would need a slight modification. Hart argues
that there are two problems with the idea of habits of obedience
when it is used to account for the continuity of legislative authority.
Habitual obedience can neither confer on a successor the right to
succeed nor render it probable that the successor's orders will receive the same obedience as those of the predecessor. If a generally
accepted rule of succession confers the right to legislate while habits
of obedience do not, the first criticism holds. The second criticism,
however, must be examined in light of the following argument,
which refers to a generally accepted rule that the word of a class of
persons is to be obeyed:
The acceptance, and so the existence, of such a rule will be
manifested during Rex I's lifetime in part by obedience to him,
but also by acknowledgements that obedience is something to
which he has a right by virtue of his qualification under the
general rule. Just because the scope of a rule accepted at a given
time by a group may look forward in general terms to successors
in the office of legislator in this way, its acceptance affords us
grounds both for the statement of law that the successor has a
right to legislate, even before he starts to do so, and for the statement of fact that he is likely to receive the same obedience as his
predecessor does."
This argument supposes the general acceptance of a rule of recognition that contains a rule of succession; from such a rule of recognition, Rex I has a claim to both de jure and de facto authority.
Therefore, Rex I may have a claim to legitimate authority, upon
which he will assert the de jure right to legislate as well as the de
facto right to have his word obeyed. Thus, Hart says of Rex I that
he will have the right to legislate under a generally accepted rule,
but also that the acceptance of this rule will be manifested "by
acknowledgements that obedience is something to which he has a
right by virtue of his qualification under the general rule." When
there is general acceptance of a rule of recognition, acceptance, by
79. Id. at 57-58.
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definition, must be manifested by acknowledgements that it is right
to obey Rex I or that one ought to obey him. But these manifestations of de facto authority will not follow "by virtue of his qualification under the general rule"; Rex I's qualification under the general
rule implies that he has the de jure right to legislate, though not
necessarily de facto authority or even de facto power. It does not
follow, therefore, from a secondary rule of succession alone, that Rex
II "is likely to receive the same obedience as his predecessor does."
Consequently, if Hart wants to maintain that the acceptance of a
rule implies both the right to legislate and the likelihood that a
successor will receive the same obedience as the predecessor, this
must be a rule that is both generally accepted in the society as well
as a rule of recognition containing a rule of change of succession. It
will not suffice to reply that the main point of Hart's argument is
that the general acceptance of such a rule implies both the right to
legislate and the likelihood of obedience "Lj]ust because the scope
of a rule accepted at a given time by a group may look forward in
general terms to successors in the office of legislator." If such a rule
is a rule of succession specifying a line or class of persons who are
to legislate, a person who satisfies the qualifications specified in the
rule will claim a de jure right to legislate as long as this rule is
accepted. But the forward-looking scope of a general rule cannot
imply the likelihood of future obedience, regardless of whether the
generally accepted rule is one of succession or recognition. As Hart
himself points out, society's acceptance of a rule at one moment
does not guarantee its continued existence. 0 A social rule exists if
and only if it is accepted. The general acceptance now of a rule of
succession does afford grounds for the statement of law that a successor has a right to legislate before taking office, although this
does not guarantee that a successor will have the right to legislate
upon taking office. The acceptance now of a rule does not imply its
continued acceptance in the future. One can hardly argue that the
scope of an accepted rule, whether it refers to a future line of legislators or to legislators in the past, implies the statement of fact that
a successor is likely to enjoy the same obedience as the predecessor.
The relevance of this detailed examination of Hart's discussion of
the continuity of legislative authority is not, for the purposes of this
Article, that Hart's criticism of Austinian habits of obedience fails.
Indeed, Hart's main criticism, that habitual obedience cannot ac80. Id. at 58.

1976]

LEGAL SYSTEM

count for the right or title to succeed, appears to be decisive. The
concern here has not been to evaluate Hart's criticism of habits of
obedience, but rather to elucidate his concept of authority as a
propaeduetic to the rationale behind the two minimum conditions
for the existence of a legal system.
The main reasons the legal officials generally must accept the
secondary rules of recognition, adjudication, and change have been
explained already. Unless there were some actual practice of acceptance, there would be no secondary rules at all, for the existence of
a social rule is constituted by the acceptance of that rule. And, for
reasons to be encountered shortly, private citizens cannot be expected to accept the secondary rules; hence, the legal officials at
least are required to accept them. Furthermore, Hart argues that
the very attitude of officials toward the secondary rules cannot be
characterized as one of mere obedience:
This is most patently the case with the ultimate rule of recognition in terms of which the validity of other rules is assessed. This,
if it is to exist at all, must be regarded from the internal point of
view as a public, common standard of correct judicial decision,
and not as something which each judge merely obeys for his part
only. Individual courts of the system though they may, on occasion, deviate from these rules must, in general, be critically concerned with such deviations as lapses from standards, which are
essentially common or public. This is not merely a matter of the
efficiency or health of the legal system, but is logically a necessary condition of our ability to speak of the existence of a single
legal sytem. If only some judges acted 'for their part only' on the
footing that what the Queen in Parliament enacts is law, and
made no criticisms of those who did not respect this rule of recognition, the characteristic unity and continuity of a legal system
would have disappeared. 8 '
This passage gives the impression that the rule of recognition is not
a power-conferring rule but a duty-imposing rule. Professor Joseph
Raz notes that Hart intends the rule of recognition to be interpreted
as a customary duty-imposing rule."2 Raz adds that if the rule of
81. Id. at 112-13.
82. J. RAz, THE CONCEPT OF A LEGAL SYSTEM 199 (1970).

Hart often contrasts the rule of recognition and other secondary rules with
primary rules which are rules of obligation. So presumably rules of recognition
do not impose obligations but confer powers. This hypothesis is strengthened by
the following half sentence: in certain circumstances'. . . the rule which confers
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recognition is a duty-imposing rule, "its law-subjects cannot be the
population at large, for there is no duty on ordinary people to identify certain laws and no others." ' This is not Hart's argument,
however, although under the two minimum conditions private citizens do not have a duty to identify certain laws and no others.
To explicate the rationale behind the first condition specifying
general obedience of the primary rules by private citizens, it is necessary to return to the imaginary world of Rex I and Rex II. In
describing such a simple society, Hart says, matters were oversimplified, for the description assumed that "most ordinary people not
only obeyed the law but understood and accepted the rule qualifying
a succession of lawgivers to legislate." 81The situation is significantly
more complicated in a modern society in which "it would be absurd
to think of the mass of the population, however law abiding, as
having any clear realization of. . . a continually changing body of
persons entitled to legislate." 5 Hart insists that ordinary citizens in
a modern society cannot be expected to adopt the internal point of
view and accept such rules. The private citizen therefore is required
to obey only the valid primary rules of the legal system.
Hart'sFirst Conditionfor a Legal System: General Obedience of the
Primary Rules by Private Citizens
An evaluation of the rationale for the two minimum conditions of
a legal system should begin by noting several difficulties with the
condition specifying general obedience of the primary rules by citizens. The first is that the argument is a non sequitur. From the
premise that we cannot expect private citizens to grasp adequately
the legal complexities. of the secondary rules, it does not follow that
private citizens need only obey the primary rules. On the contrary,
what follows, if anything, is that the ordinary citizen cannot be
required to accept the secondary rules because the operative premise concerns secondary rules, not primary rules. Hart's argument
jurisdiction will also be a rule of recognition'. But it is quite clear that this is
not Hart's intention, as he himself confirmed to me. In his book Hart explains
only that duty-imposing laws can be customary laws. There is no sense, according to his theory, in which power conferring laws can be customary laws, unless
they are part of a legal system of which they are not the rule of recognition.
Id., quoting HART, supra note 2, at 95 (footnotes omitted).
83. RAz, supra note 82, at 199.
84. HART, supra note 2, at 59.

85. Id.
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does not demonstrate that it is unreasonable or unrealistic to require
private citizens to accept the primary rules.
The second difficulty with the argument is the contention that the
reason acceptance cannot be required is that the ordinary citizen
cannot be expected to possess a sufficient grasp of the legal technicalities of the secondary rules. This condition will be called the
requirement of minimal legal expertise. Hart is arguing, then, that
a necessary condition for the application of the term 'acceptance' is
minimal legal expertise. Unfortunately, in characterizing the concepts of acceptance and the internal point of view, Hart does not
mention any requirement of legal expertise. Nor can such a requirement be part of the concept of acceptance, for if it were the acceptance of primary rules by citizens would be ruled out.
There is a third difficulty connected with the second. If minimal
legal expertise is required for the acceptance of secondary rules,
what becomes of Hart's characterization of citizens typically employing power-conferring rules to create structures of rights and
duties within the coercive framework of the law?" Hart says that the
possession of these powers makes the private citizen a private legislator, whereas without the rules, the citizen would be a mere dutybearer." Furthermore, as Hart emphasizes, "[t]he power thus conferred on individuals to mould their legal relations with others by
contracts, wills, marriages . . . is one of the great contributions of
law to social life; and it is a feature of law obscured by representing
all law as a matter of orders backed by threats."88
Part of the problem noted in the second and third difficulties with
Hart's argument stems from his ambiguous descriptions of secondary rules as, on the one hand, power-conferring rules and, on the
other hand, as rules about the primary rules. Perhaps Hart could
amend his position so that minimal legal expertise is required for
the acceptance of certain technically complex secondary rules, but
is not required for the acceptance of many of the secondary powerconferring rules that would enable ordinary citizens to be private
legislators. If such an amendment were available, there would be no
reason to require acceptance of the secondary rules by the legal
officials only. The three difficulties with Hart's argument show,
therefore, that the rationale for the two minimum conditions does
86. Id. at 27.
87. Id. at 40.
88. Id. at 28.
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not establish that private citizens need not be required to accept at
least some of the primary rules and some of the secondary rules.
But there is a fourth difficulty with the rationale for the two
minimum conditions that requires thorough consideration. If private citizens are not required to accept the valid primary rules, and
if legal officials are required to accept only the secondary rules, it
seems that no one is required to accept the primary rules of the legal
system. But if neither citizens nor officials need accept the primary
rules, in what sense must these rules be social rules and rules of
obligation? To be rules of obligation, primary rules must be social
rules; to be social rules, primary rules must be accepted. Consequently, the two minimum conditions apparently must be amended
so that either officials or citizens, or both, accept the primary rules.
It seems that in THE CONCEPT OF LAW Hart provides the following
response to the fourth difficulty. Primary rules are social rules imposing obligations not because of any attitudes toward them on the
part of citizens, but because they are the valid rules of the system
in that they satisfy all the criteria provided by the secondary rule
of recognition which must be accepted by the legal officials. Hart
puts it this way in commenting on the rule of recognition:
This is not a necessity, but a luxury, found in advanced social
systems whose members not merely come to accept separate rules
piecemeal, but are committed to the acceptance in advance of
general classes of rule, marked out by general criteria of validity.
In the simpler form of society we must wait and see whether a
rule gets accepted as a rule or not; in a system with a basic rule
of recognition we can say before a rule is actually made, that it
will be valid if it conforms to the requirements of the rule of
recognition. 9
Hart'sSecond Conditionfor a Legal System: Acceptance of Secondary Rules by Legal Officials
The second minimum condition requires officials to accept the
secondary rules generally. If they do, a particular rule will be valid;
if the rule is valid, it imposes a legal obligation on those subject to
it because they are committed to the acceptance of valid rules in
advance. It does not matter, therefore, that no one is required to
accept the primary rules because accepted secondary rules of
change will empower officials to introduce new primary rules citi89. Id. at 229.
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zens are committed to accept in advance. It is not necessary that
everyone accept a primary rule for it to impose an obligation; a
hardened criminal may not accept a particular legal rule for any
variety of reasons or motives yet he is legally obligated to obey the
rule if it is valid. The legal system has the right to punish him
because its coercive power rests on its accepted authority:
It is true, as we have already emphasized in discussing the need

for and the possibility of sanctions, that if a system of rules is to
be imposed by force on any, there must be a sufficient number
who accept it voluntarily. Without their voluntary co-operation,
thus creating authority, the coercive power of law and government cannot be established."

Hart also writes that "a necessary condition of the existence of
coercive power is that some at least must voluntarily co-operate in
the system and accept its rules. In this sense it is true that the
coercive power of law presupposes its accepted authority.""1 Therefore the primary rules are legally obligatory because of the voluntary
acceptance of the authority of the legal system.
Several aspects of this interpretation of Hart's response must be
clarified. First, the reason "a necessary condition of the existence
of coercive power is that some at least must voluntarily co-operate
in the system and accept its rules" is contained in Hart's discussion
of the minimum content of Natural Law. The truism that there is
approximate equality among humans in regard to physical strength
and intellectual capacity means that
no individual is so much more powerful than others, that he is
able, without co-operation, to dominate or subdue them for more
than a short period. Even the strongest must sleep at times and,
when asleep, loses temporarily his superiority. This fact of approximate equality, more than any other, makes obvious the necessity for a system of mutual forbearance and compromise which

is the basis of both legal and moral obligation."
Given the fact of approximate equality, it is a natural necessity for
the existence of coercive power that there be a minimum of voluntary cooperation in a system of mutual forbearances. This minimum
of voluntary cooperation and acceptance that create the authority
of the legal system may be limited to a small dominant group that
90. Id. at 196.
91. Id. at 198.
92. Id. at 190-91.
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uses the coercive power of the system to further its own ends at the
expense of those whose loyalty to the system is based on fear. In a
regime of primary rules alone, whose authority rests on general acceptance throughout the society, this would be quite unlikely; yet
the "cost" of stepping from the pre-legal to the legal world "is the
risk that the centrally organized power may well be used for the
oppression of numbers with whose support it can dispense, in a way
that the simpler regime of primary rules could not." 3 The authority
of a legal system, parallel to the conditions for its existence, must
rest upon the voluntary acceptance of the legal system by its legal
officials at least; their voluntary acceptance also will be sufficient
to establish the authority of the legal system.
Secondly, Hart argues that those who do accept voluntarily the
authority of the legal system need not think of themselves as morally bound to do so:
In fact,

. .

.allegiance to the system may be based on many

different considerations: calculations of long-term interest; disinterested interest in others; an unreflecting inherited or traditional
attitude; or the mere wish to do as others do. There is indeed no
reason why those who accept the authority of the system should
not examine their conscience and decide that, morally, they
ought
not to accept it, yet for a variety of reasons continue to do
9 4
SO.

"Those who accept the authority of a legal system," Hart continues,
"look upon it from the internal point of view, and express their sense
of its requirements in internal statements couched in the normative
language which is common to both law and morals.. . ."' Accept-

ance, though necessary for a rule of moral obligation, is not sufficient. Not all social rules of obligation are moral rules. The acceptance of a legally obligatory rule does not imply a moral obligation;
on the contrary, there may be moral reasons to disobey a valid legal
rule.
Recall that the fourth difficulty with the two minimum conditions
is that if neither officials nor citizens are required to accept the
primary rules of the legal system, apparently the primary rules are
neither social rules nor rules of obligation. The response I have
devised is that the valid primary rules are legally obligatory rules
93. Id. at 198.
94. Id. at 198-99.
95. Id. at 199.
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because the legal officials have the authority to make new legal rules
that the citizens are committed to accept in advance. It will be
argued that this response does not meet the objection, and the reply
will be divided into three parts: (1) Hart's contention that the authority of a legal system is created by the voluntary acceptance of
the legal system by the legal officials; (2) Hart's argument that the
authority of a legal system may rest on prudential grounds; (3)
Hart's notion of the members of society being "committed to the
acceptance in advance" of valid rules.
Authority of Legal System Created by Voluntary Acceptance by
Officials
The first question is: In what sense is Hart using the term
*'authority' in speaking of the authority of a legal system? He cannot
mean that the authority of a legal system is de jure authority, because although de jure authority implies the right or title, under a
system of rules, procedures, or methods of entitlements, to do certain things, such as to make laws, there is no sense in which it can
be asserted intelligibly that the entire legal system exercises de jure
legal authority. Questions can be raised about the de jure authority
of a particular legal official or about the de jure authoritative status
of a particular rule, and their authority may be traced back to
certain constitutional rules. In Hart's terms, internal questions
about the rights of a particular official or about the validity of a
particular law will be raised. But, similar to Hart's view that there
can be no internal questions of validity concerning the rule of recognition, there can be no de jure questions about the authority of the
legal system. It is a tautology to say that the legal system itself is
the very system of rules upon which the de jure authority of the legal
system is authorized.
To assert of an entire legal system or government that it has
authority is, properly speaking, to assert that it has legitimate
power. That is to say, a legal system or government has legitimate
power if and only if those who exercise it have the de jure right or
title to perform certain actions as well as the de facto authority to
elicit a certain kind of obedience involving respect or trust. Indeed,
this is the kind of notion of authority employed in the argument that
the valid primary rules are legally obligatory rules because the legal
officials have the authority to make new legal rules the citizens are
committed to accept in advance. In this argument, the legal officials
have authority in the sense that they have the de jure right,' under
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the rule of recognition, to make laws and they have the de facto
authority to have their laws accepted in advance by citizens.
This argument fails, however, because it hardly can be said that
the legal officials whose voluntary acceptance creates authority
have de facto authority, for that would be to assert that they have
de facto authority because they have the ability to elicit allegiance
to themselves. They may be devoted to themselves, and yet be
ignored by the citizens. Nor will it suffice to argue that the legal
officials will have de facto authority because their laws will be accepted in advance by citizens. Hart does not require that the citizens accept the primary rules.
Authority of Legal System May Rest on Prudential Grounds
Hart maintains that the authority of a legal system presupposes
its voluntary acceptance by legal officials, and that their voluntary
acceptance of, or allegiance to, the legal system may rest on prudential grounds. The authority of the entire legal system, as I have
argued above, cannot rest on legal grounds. Apparently Hart would
agree, for he argues that the authority of the legal system may rest
on prudential or moral grounds. The position Hart defends in regard
to a modern legal system is in sharp contrast to the simple society
of Rex, where "it will be generally accepted that it is right to obey
him."" To say that it is right to obey Rex cannot mean that the
basis for obligation may be self-interest; the right thing to do may
conflict with self-interest. To assert that it is right to obey Rex
means that it is morally obligatory to obey him. In the world of Rex,
where there is general acceptance of a rule of recognition specifying
his word as law, Rex has grounds for a claim to moral authority. In
a modem society it is not necessary that the authority of the legal
system rest on moral grounds. Incidentally, if voluntary acceptance
in a modern society does not imply moral obligation, there is no
reason to suppose that general acceptance implies moral obligation
in the world of Rex.
It is submitted that the authority of a legal system cannot rest on
prudential grounds. It does not seem that self-interest is either necessary or sufficient for de facto authority, because de facto authority
may be acknowledged by a citizen for moral reasons. Nor is selfinterest sufficient for de facto authority; that it might be in one's
self-interest to turn the money over to the gunman does not imply
96. HART, supra note 2, at 57.
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that the gunman has de facto authority. Self-interest is not compatible with the distinctive kind of obedience or allegiance characteristic of de facto authority. Hart is correct that the acceptance of a law
does not imply moral obligation. But apparently from the proposition that legal obligation does not imply moral obligation he infers
incorrectly that this is parallel to the statement that acceptance of
the authority of the legal system may rest on prudential or moral
grounds.
Members of Society Committed to Acceptance of Rules in Advance
The notion of citizens being "committed to the acceptance in
advance" immediately strikes the careful reader of THE CONCEPT OF

as inconsistent with Hart's characterization of the acceptance
of social rules. The notion of "acceptance in advance" appears to
be a contradiction in terms because the existence of a social rule is
constituted by its acceptance, which does not guarantee its continued existence. What this objection must take into account is that
Hart allows for secondary rules of change that empower persons or
bodies of persons to introduce new rules or eliminate old rules. If
new rules introduced by rules of change are valid, they will be legal
rules whether they are accepted or not. If old rules are eliminated
by rules of change according to valid procedures, they no longer will
be legal rules, even though they still may be accepted by citizens.
Hence acceptance is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of legal rules. Acceptance of valid rules in advance is not a
contradiction. Thus the fourth difficulty with the two minimum
conditions is dissolved; primary rules may exist even though acceptance of them is not required by either officials or citizens.
Once we consider Hart's allowance of secondary rules of change
by which primary rules may be introduced or eliminated, thereby
rendering acceptance neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of social rules, the objection is reinforced rather than refuted.
.Hart develops and defends only one concept of social rules in THE
CONCEPT OF LAw-social rules are constituted by acceptance. Even
under the supposition that Hart can explicate an adequate concept
of social rules, the notion of citizens being "committed to the acceptance in advance" of valid rules would not support the two minimum conditions; if citizens are committed to acceptance in advance
of primary rules, then they are required to accept the primary rules.
Finally, the notion of commitment in advance to acceptance of valid
rules depends upon a notion of authority that has been found defective.
LAW
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CONCLUSION

The first section of this Article elucidated the two minimum conditions for the existence of a legal system in terms of four distinctions: the difference between primary rules of obligation and secondary rules of recognition, change, and adjudication; how habitual
obedience differs from the acceptance of a social rule; how rules of
obligation are differentiated from rules that do not impose obligations; and the distinction between 'law' and 'legal system.' This
Article has argued that Hart does offer a set of individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions for the existence of a legal
system, though not for the application of the term 'law,' which is
best described as a "cluster concept." It was argued also that a
major defect of the two minimum conditions is that a distinction
upon which they are based, that between primary and secondary'
rules, is not drawn adequately.
The third section examined the rationale for the two minimum
conditions. It also was argued that in addition to the ambiguous
distinction between primary and secondary rules there are four more
difficulties: it is a non sequitur to conclude that citizens need only
obey the primary rules because they cannot be required to accept
the secondary rules; minimal legal expertise is not a requirement of
acceptance; minimal legal expertise, if necessary for acceptance of
secondary rules, seems to prevent citizens from being private legislators; and if neither officials nor citizens are required to accept the
primary rules, in what sense are they social rules of obligation? To
the latter objection, I devised the response that the primary rules
are legally obligatory rules because the legal officials have the authority to make new legal rules to which the citizens are committed
to acceptance in advance if the new rules are valid. Three arguments were directed against this response: (1) the authority of a
legal system is not created by the voluntary acceptance of the legal
system by the legal officials; (2) the authority of the legal system
cannot rest on prudential grounds; (3) the notion of citizens being
committed to acceptance in advance of valid rules fails.
It has been argued, then, that the three distinctions on which the
two minimum conditions are based are defective. First, the
primary-secondary distinction is ambiguous. Second, the distinction between habitual obedience and the acceptance of a social rule
is not clear because the notion of a social rule is developed and
defended in terms of acceptance, while in the case of valid rules
introduced or eliminated by secondary rules of change it is neither
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necessary nor sufficient that such primary rules be accepted. Third,
the distinction between rules of obligation and rules that do not
impose obligations is not clear for two reasons. If a valid legal rule
is to impose a legal obligation, it first must be a rule. Also, the
grounds for citizens being committed (that is, obligated) to acceptance in advance of valid rules must be rejected because Hart's notion of authority is deficient.
That acceptance is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of social rules reveals a deep inconsistency in THE CONCEPT OF
LAW. The great virtue of the idea of a social rule constituted by
acceptance is that because the criteria for the acceptance of a rule
are behavioral, external statements of fact may be made about the
existence of the rule; at the same time, because the internal point
of view is a criterion for acceptance, normative statements may be
made about the value or the validity" of a rule. In a legal system,
the existence of any rule (theoretically) may be verified; questions
about the moral or non-moral value of any rule may be raised;
questions about the validity may be raised about every rule except
the rule of recognition. With this complex notion of the acceptance
of a social rule, Hart can preserve the fundamental contention of
legal positivism: there is a factual criterion distinguishing law from
morals. That is to say, all the legal rules of a society can be determined conclusively by reference to an existing rule of recognition.
For moral rules it is neither necessary nor sufficient that there be
an actually existing rule of recognition by which to determine the
moral rules; not everyone agrees that the word of God, the BmLE,
or the KORAN determines what is morally right. On the other hand,
the notion of the acceptance of a social rule enables Hart to correct
the Austinian model of law as commands backed by threats. By
introducing the idea of a normative rule, Hart not only corrects
Austin but also demonstrates a way in which legal positivism may
be dissociated from the Hobbesian idea that a sovereign or legal
system may rest on power. The notion of acceptance is a rejection
of the dichotomy between 'law based merely on power' and 'law
which is accepted as morally binding'.""9
The great limitation of the notion of acceptance of a social rule is
that although it is necessary for the existence of a rule of obligation,
it is not sufficient. No amount of acceptance alone of the secondary
97. Value and validity are not equivalent for Hart.
98. HART,supra note 2, at 198.

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 18:287

rules by the legal officials will yield a rule that imposes an obligation, legal or otherwise. The two minimum conditions do not imply
the existence of a system that has primary rules of legal obligation.
By itself, then, the notion of acceptance does not enable Hart to
distinguish between a legal system based on power and a legal system based on authority. Hence, if Hart is to break cleanly with the
Hobbesian tradition, the notion of the acceptance of a social rule
must be supplemented by another concept of social rule that
squares with our concepts of obligation and authority. But Hart
does not see this clearly in THE CONCEPT OF LAW. Still thinking that
the notion of acceptance of a social rule will enable him to split the
dichotomy between law based on power and law based on morals,
he attempts to found the coercive power of law upon the accepted
authority by officials of the legal system and to establish legal
obligation upon a commitment to acceptance in advance of the
valid primary rules of obligation by citizens. But neither acceptance
nor Hart's concept of authority will yield the idea of obligation. It
is possible, therefore, for a system of power alone to satisfy the two
minimum conditions for the existence of a legal system. For example, if the legal officials (a fraction of the population) generally
accept the secondary rules solely for the reason that without their
own voluntary cooperation they could not maintain their own coercive power, and if they coerce the citizens into general obedience of
the primary rules, then a legal system exists whose coercive power
rests on its accepted authority by the legal officials. It is submitted
that this is a system of power without authority, and that it is
consistent with the minimum content of Natural Law. But such a
system of power backed by threats is precisely the kind of model of
law Hart rejects, and is clearly inconsistent with Hart's characterization of rules of obligation. As has been said, however, once it is
seen that acceptance is neither necessary nor sufficient for the existence of a social rule, a deep inconsistency is revealed in THE CONCEPT OF LAW.

If a concept of legal system that is not based solely on power is
desired, then we need the idea of a normative rule, as THE CONCEPT
OF LAW superbly demonstrates. As Hart perceives, however, the alternative to law based on power is law based on authority. But as
Hart also knows, the notion of authority is a most difficult and
controversial concept. Any government or legal system nevertheless
will attempt to justify the imposition of legal obligation on its subjects by appeal to authority. Whether any government or legal system possesses authority is, however, another controversial jurispru-

1976]

LEGAL SYSTEM

319

dential issue. In any event, any normative rule that imposes obligation must justify itself: in the case of a legal rule, the justification
ultimately will be traced to the constitution, or, in Hart's terms, to
the rule of recognition. Whether the constitution or the rule of recognition has the authority to impose legal obligation is, however, a
question not just for jurisprudence but also for political philosophy.
Hopefully this Article has shown not only that the two minimum
conditions for the existence of a legal system are inadequate, but
also that a major source of the difficulty is that the two minimum
conditions rest on unexamined assumptions about the nature of
political obligation and political authority.

